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SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE 21st CENTURY POPULIST

September 15, 2003  

 WORKING OUR WAY OUT OF IRAQ

by Don Schellhardt  

In the September 15, 2003 article for my 21st CENTURY POPULIST column, I reviewed some of the latest evidence that the American/British invasion and occupation of Iraq has been a mistake.  

At the close of that article, I asked:    "Having MADE a mistake, in attacking Iraq , what do we do to FIX the situation?"  

This SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT is an attempt to answer that question.  

A.       The "first principle of medicine", as expressed in the Hippocratic Oath, is a good starting point:  

"First, do no harm."  

In other words, we should start our planning by choosing NOT to do anything which would make the situation WORSE.  

At least 3 items of practical advice come to mind:  

(1)     LET'S NOT WIDEN THE WAR.     The Bush Administration's past hints of future attacks on Iran or Syria have, over time, faded away    --    in tandem with the rising costs, in both money and blood, of "just" occupying Iraq .     Nevertheless, in the annals of history there have certainly been American Presidents, AND leaders of other nations, who have attempted to reverse a trend toward military defeat by widening the scope of a war.     I can hear in my mind, already, the possible future argument that terrorists within Iraq can never be defeated until their "supplies" from neighboring countries are "interdicted at the source".  

During the Vietnam War, however, American "incursions" into Cambodia and Laos , and the bombing of what was then North Vietnam , only  served to delay the eventual defeat of what was then South Vietnam     --    while inflating the overall human, environmental and fiscal costs of the war.       

Yes, it can be argued that the defeat of South Vietnam was a political victory, rather than a military victory, for North Vietnam :   a victory attained not by defeating America directly but by slowly wearing down America 's willingness to accept the bloodshed.     This argument is probably correct.     

Yet the practical question remains:     

If the American people were not willing to see their country fight indefinitely to "defend" South Vietnam , why should it be assumed that they are willing to see their country fight indefinitely to "reconstruct" Iraq ?  

(2)      LET'S AVOID A "ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL" APPROACH TO BOTH IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN .      The President's budget request lumps together the costs of both occupying and reconstructing both Iraq and Afghanistan .     The mainstream media has generally followed suit by combining under one label    --   "the war on terror"   --    the President's spending proposals for both countries (and also his spending proposals  for both military and non-military activities).  

This approach is useful for conveying to the public the total scale of the currently contemplated commitment.     This approach can also be risky, however,  if it encourages America to adopt a single strategy for both nations.  

Although Afghanistan clearly requires more attention from us than it has received, particularly with respect to reconstruction, in general the American presence in that country appears to be much more sustainable than the American presence in Iraq .     In Afghanistan , we entered the fray as allies of an INTERNAL challenge to the Taliban that was already underway:    that is, we "put our thumb on the scale" in a civil war that was already (thank God!) an Afghan-versus-Afghan conflict.     In Iraq , notwithstanding reports to the contrary from Iraqis in exile, the closest thing to an organized opposition to Saddam Hussein were the militant factions among the Shiite Muslim majority.     Unlike the Northern Afghan tribes, who welcomed our military involvement in Afghanistan , Saddam Hussein's primary internal opponents appear to have hated us even more than they hated him.  

As a result of these and other factors, the new government of Afghanistan enjoyed, from Day One, more independence from American control, and also more support from the nation's citizens, than the emerging "government" in Iraq can claim after 6 months.

 It is no accident, then, that the new government in Afghanistan , and with it the American military presence in Afghanistan , is visibly more stable than the interim "government" in Iraq .      Indeed, if I may venture Out On A Limb, I believe the American military presence in Afghanistan is more sustainable, over the long run, than the American military presence at the "staging area" bases in Pakistan .      

That is:   I predict the government of Pakistan will ask our troops to leave before the new government of Afghanistan does.  

What we see, in these cases, is the difference in results between decisive aid to pre-existing INTERNAL opponents of the Taliban   --   who are now establishing a government that is more their own creation than ours   --    and the attempted imposition of a new Iraqi government by outsiders who were largely uninvited.  

Thus, an American decision to withdraw from Iraq , either quickly or over a phased period, should NOT automatically trigger a decision to withdraw from Afghanistan as well.       

Indeed, the Afghans may well want our troops, or at least some of them, to stay there indefinitely.    With steadily increasing military forces, both nuclear and non-nuclear, looming in China to the northeast    ...   and with a rising number of nuclear missiles being deployed by the fundamentalist Islamic leaders of Pakistan to the west    ...    a strong case can be made that a permanent American counterweight to these forces will serve the interests of both Afghanistan and the U.S.A.  

(3)      LET'S NOT LEAVE OUR CHILDREN THE BILL FOR OUR MISTAKE.      To the extent that America (or at least its Congress) does choose to spend all or most of the money that has been proposed (or secretly contemplated) for Iraqi occupation and reconstruction, let's not follow the Bush Administration's preference for simply adding the tab to the national debt.     With previous Congressional approval of tax cuts proposed by the  Bush Administration, the Federal budget for this year alone is already projected to be almost $400 billion.     Adding the President's  proposed new spending, without simultaneously establishing an offsetting increase in taxes, could raise this year's surge in the national debt to half a trillion dollars.      That figure, once again, is for this year alone.  

Depending upon prevailing rates for Treasury notes and other instruments of Federal borrowing, the annual interest on $500 billion in new national debt could easily reach $50 billion a year or more    --    payable each year and every year into the indefinite future, by our children and our children's children and our children's children's children, until the debt is paid off or the country goes bankrupt.     Please note, By The Way, that $50 billion is the estimated annual burden BEFORE adding in the effect of COMPOUND INTEREST (that is, interest due on the interest).       

$50 billion in new, annually payable interest almost equals the entire amount of money that is now spent annually on ALL forms of Federal aid to primary and secondary school education, combined    ...     almost twice the entire sum of ALL annual Federal aid for construction and maintenance of highways    ...     roughly 3 times the entire annual budget for the entire U.S. space program     ...    and more than 4 times the entire annual budget for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  

Let's not burden ourselves, and future generations, with endless interest on money we have borrowed to pay for the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq .     If we must spend some or all of this money, let's "pay as we go".     Let's either shave the recently approved tax cuts by the amount of the newly approved spending    --   or more, if this is politically possible    --    OR ELSE establish a new tax that is designed to end when the Iraqi occupation ends.      An $87 billion surcharge on all barrels of imported oil (roughly an added $40 per imported barrel, or an additional 50 cents per average retailed American gasoline) would be a fitting source of revenue    ...    and it might have a wonderful educational value, in terms of letting consumers see more of the REAL (but currently hidden) costs of importing foreign oil.  

B.        Another useful principle is this one:  

"Let's not kid ourselves."  

We can't pass this buck on to Somebody Else.      

" U.S. out, UN in," said Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) during a recent debate of Democratic Presidential candidates in Baltimore .     The Congressman would just say "No" to the President's $87 billion request and ask the United Nations to take over the occupation of Iraq .  

Putting aside the considerable challenge of persuading the United Nations (or, alternatively, an expanded coalition of individual nations) to take on this thankless task, shifting the "official" responsibility now would not change the basic choices.     A handover to the UN and/or NATO might, POSSIBLY, permit some shifting of the BLAME for the problems in Iraq     --   which is one reason for the idea's appeal to American politicians   --      but it would not be likely to change the fundamental dynamics of the situation.  

Put simply:     Iraqi citizens who resist taking orders from Americans and Britons are not likely to accept taking orders from the United Nations or NATO.      The Iraqi people's fundamental desires for national autonomy, combined in many cases with a fundamentalist Shiite version of religious and cultural purity, would still be frustrated     --    and resistance to the occupation would likely continue.  

A UN and/or NATO occupation would, therefore, probably develop in one of two directions    --    both of them likely to be counter-productive.  

(1)     THE "FIG LEAF" SCENARIO.     The UN and/or NATO would move in, but American and British troops would continue to form "the backbone" of the occupation, doing most of the fighting, most of the killing and most of the dying.      The UN and/or NATO would function largely as a "fig leaf"   --   with America and Britain continuing to run the show, just below the surface.      However, the political need for maintaining the "cover story" of "official" UN and/or NATO leadership might well give UN and/or NATO just enough of a voice to hamstring decisive decision-making by the U.S. and Great Britain .       

In practice:     The result would be more of the status quo    --    but with many more Committees and one coating of new paint.     It would be the "same old, same old", but with additional inefficiency.  

OR    ...  

(2)    THE INTERNATIONALISM-IN-REALITY SCENARIO.     Under this scenario, which would be much more likely to occur under a Democratic President than under President Bush, the UN and/or NATO would REALLY  "run the show" in Iraq.      The new leaders of the Iraqi occupation would, of course, quickly run into the same obstacles which are now being encountered by the United States and Great Britain .      Not being encumbered by the American and British emotional investment in the project    --    and probably, as a consequence of the shift in control of the Iraqi occupation, having to work with a reduced level of military commitment by America and Britain    --     the new leaders of the occupation would probably decide, sooner or later, to withdraw.   

This might be a thinly distinguished withdrawal    --    such as the formal transfer of power to a newly formed, fundamentalist Shiite government, loosely allied with Iran , but with a few hundred soldiers left behind to "officially" monitor a disarmament treaty.      However, it would be a withdrawal nonetheless.  

Under either scenario, American and British leaders would gain political "cover" for taking one of two difficult paths:    either indefinite continuation of the status quo, with the UN and/or NATO acting as a "fig leaf" (and perhaps as a marginal source for additional troops), or a phased (or not-so-phased) withdrawal.    In either case, however, there would be a price to be paid for the political "cover":    that is, the loss of opportunities that might be available if the United States and Great Britain were willing to "bite the bullet" THEMSELVES.  

IF the REAL goal of American and British policy is indefinite continuation of the status quo    --    which, under the present Presidential Administration in America, I believe to be the case    --     then the two nations which are "on the firing line" will have more military and diplomatic options, and therefore more operational efficiency, if they do not have to consult with 27 other countries every time they want to raid a village (or fix a powerplant).  

On The Other Hand:     IF the REAL goal is truly to have the UN and/or NATO "take charge" of the Iraqi occupation    --     which, I believe, is the sincere intention of SOME of the current Democratic Presidential candidates    --    then we should be honest enough, with ourselves and with other nations, to acknowledge that this is really a vote for withdrawal-by-proxy.  

In that case, we could almost certainly negotiate better terms for ourselves, and for our allies in the region, if we "cut the deal" for phased withdrawal DIRECTLY.    

Since I believe that American and British withdrawal from Iraq WILL (or, at least, should) occur, sooner or later, I will focus in the balance of this SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT on the question of HOW to salvage as much as we can from the present situation, within the context of continued

control of the occupation.  

C.       This is the strategy for phased withdrawal which I personally recommend:  

(1)    SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL.     ON SECOND THOUGHT:    MAKE THAT  ** TWO **  DATES.      Much of the tension generated by the current Iraqi occupation, in the United States and Great Britain as well as in the Middle East , can be traced to the open-ended and ambiguous nature of the American and British military involvement.   

In terms of political support  "on the home front"  for military action(s) on foreign soil, phrases such as "for the duration" or "as long as it takes" CAN be solidifying expressions of grim determination    --    IF the declarations are made in the context of a war such as World War II, marked by an extremely supportive consensus of public opinion AND a credible prospect of the war's "winnability".     

On The Other Hand:     In the context of a war such as Vietnam, in which military action is initiated without a solid consensus of public support, AND in which the "winnability" of the war becomes subject to serious doubt, phrases such as "for the duration" or "as long as it takes" can take on a chilling aura, if not a terrifying one.      Rather than evoking a "will of iron" among the public, to win a winnable war, these phrases can come to mean instead a government which is mindlessly wedded to collective masochism     --    committed, in the mind of the general public, not to victory at any price but rather to an endless, but futile, BATTLE for a victory that cannot be achieved.  

Saying this may be a cliche, but the occupation of Iraq does appear, at this point, to echo Vietnam much more than it echoes World War II.     The occupation appears to be a bloody and increasingly expensive attempt to impose an Anglo-American vision of representative democracy, and secular government, upon a native population that is willing to accept only SOME of that vision    --   if any.       It is the FUTILITY of this enterprise, not its absolute cost in lives or dollars, that makes its indefinite continuation politically unsustainable in America .      

Americans, despite some cultural backsliding in recent decades, are still a "can do" people.     If we "can't do" in Iraq    --    if what we have to offer is not what they want to accept right now    --    then we will ultimately want to move on to other nations, where our presence, and our vision, is more welcome.      Rhett Butler to the contrary:    We Americans resist, fiercely, at some truly primal level, investing too much blood or money in a lost cause.      We detest losing too much to knowingly engage in it for very long.  

American leaders who forget this characteristic of the collective American psyche do so at their peril.  

Further, if these leaders believe that they can continue to "play the shell game" of publicly equating the TACTICAL action of occupying Iraq with the STRATEGIC challenge of defeating or containing terrorism    --    when they are clearly TWO DIFFERENT THINGS    --   then these leaders are making the additional mistake of under-estimating the intelligence of the everyday American.  

That would make two strikes:     Forcing Americans to stay in a war they are losing AND treating Americans as if they were idiots.    One more strike, and the Bush Administration is out.       

The American people are just now coming to realize that the ouster of Saddam Hussein had little or nothing to do with the defeat of Osama bin Laden.     Indeed, it is beginning to dawn on them that America may have actually STRENGTHENED bin Laden's hand by removing a RIVAL from power.      Soon the American people will come to the related realization that Iraq is only ONE battlefield, and probably not the most important one, in the Western world's battle against terrorism in general and jihadism in particular.       At this point, the political pressures for withdrawal will become even stronger than they are now.  

Still, in war there are retreats    --    and there are routs.     If the leaders of America and Britain act now to plan an orderly RETREAT, they may be able to avoid a ROUT later on.  

Setting "a date certain" for the American and British withdrawal from Iraq     --    IF the date is actually believed, which is a separate problem    --   should reduce some of the political tensions in America and Great Britain immediately.     This should free the military and diplomatic agents of those countries to focus more time and energy on the HOW of withdrawal, instead of continuing frantic efforts to "bail out the Atlantic " on the question of WHETHER to withdraw.  

At the same time, setting "a date certain" for withdrawal from Iraq    --    again, IF the date is believed    --    should reduce the ability of jihadists to recruit Shiite Iraqis, and for that matter Shiites in neighboring countries, who are currently standing on the line (or stepping just slightly over the line) between cultural conservatism and a commitment to a holy war.     That is:    It makes more sense for a Shiite "fence sitter" to help with the sabotage of an Iraqi oil pipeline, or at least look the other way, IF he or she has received no real reassurance that the Americans and the British will EVER leave without a violent push from the Iraqi people.     Conversely, IF the same "fence sitting" Shiite is convinced (or at least persuaded) that the Iraqi pipeline will REALLY BE Iraqi again within a year or two, he or she has much less of an incentive to blow it up.  

To make the most of this potential for driving a wedge between jihadists on the one hand and Shiite Muslim fundamentalists on the other, we should set a definite TWO FRAME for withdrawal     --     bounded on either end by an optimal (early) date and a "fallback" (later) date.     Within this range, the actual date of departure would depend upon the behavior of the Iraqi people.     To avoid too long a "ramp" to withdrawal, however, the earliest date for withdrawal and the latest date for withdrawal should be separated from each other by no more than a year.  

Let me provide an example of how this approach might work:  

Let us assume that the "optimal" withdrawal date were set for December 31, 2004 (shortly after the next Presidential election, thereby assuring particularly close scrutiny by Congress and the media during the transition process).      Then the contingency (fallback) date might be set for December 31, 2005 .     Both of these dates are basically arbitrary and could be moved closer to the present if desired.  

When announcing the DEFINITE time frame for withdrawal, America and Great Britain would announce publicly that their exact departure date will be tied explicitly to the level of cooperation among the Iraqi people.      Specific factors could be, and should be, enumerated     --     notably including:    (a)    the level of violence directed against occupation troops;   (b) the level of cooperation with reconstruction efforts; and  (c) the

level of cooperation with formation of a new, popularly elected government of Iraq (hopefully, but not necessarily, a democratic Republic with SOME guarantees of individual liberties).      

Other factors could be listed, but the list should not be made too much longer than the 3 essential elements I have identified.     

I stress this point because the list of factors must, at almost any cost, avoid the impression (or the reality) of being too legalistic or controlling.      

We do NOT want to be seen by the Iraqi people as imposing a secular equivalent of The Ten Commandments, let alone a miniature version of the entire Anglo-American legal and political systems.    The list of factors must be short enough, simple enough AND basic enough that it can be understood by, and hopefully respected by and followed by, everyday Iraqi citizens.  

The CONDITIONAL variability in the exact withdrawal date would, ideally, be perceived by grassroots Iraqi citizens as clear enough and credible enough, and hopefully reasonable enough, to create a meaningful incentive for less shedding of blood, and less disruption of Iraq 's own infrastructure, during the transition process.      The less bloodshed and sabotage, and the more cooperation with formation of a new Iraqi government, the sooner the Americans and the British would leave.      Contrary behavior would EXTEND their stay.  

At the same time, the firmness of the FINAL "fallback" date, to be honored Come What May, would implicitly pay the Iraqi people the respect of recognizing their own ultimate, long-term responsibility for shaping the kind of culture, economy and political system THEY want to have.    

(2)     SET  ** ONE **  CONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL.      Our otherwise firm date of withdrawal should be subject to ONE condition:   that is, a requirement for plebiscites (popular referenda), in 3 key sections of Iraq (and POSSIBLY more, if needed), to determine whether voters in each region wish to maintain a degree of local autonomy over certain matters in post-occupation Iraq .  

(a)      REGIONAL RIGHTS OF THE KURDISH TRIBES.      Ever since the defeat of Saddam Hussein during the FIRST Persian Gulf War, the lands occupied by THE KURDISH TRIBES, in northernmost Iraq , have already been recognized as an "autonomous" region of Iraq .     The Kurds  can, and do, maintain their own  armies and police forces, operating independently of Baghdad , and decide within their own region a wide range of laws governing a wide range of local matters.    Before the United States withdraws from Iraq , citizens in the Kurdish region of the country should be able to vote on whether to retain a degree of autonomy from the rest of Iraq .    Perhaps a "super-majority" of 60 percent of the voters, or possibly an even higher percentage of the voters, should be required before the region's "autonomous" status is made permanent:    this point, and others, may be negotiable.     America and Britain should insist, however, on the basic principle of allowing the Kurds to express their preferences in the voting booth    --   and the new national government should pledge to honor their vote as a pre-condition for the withdrawal of coalition forces.  

The Kurds, as you may recall, were attacked repeatedly by the national government of Iraq when Saddam Hussein led the country.     Their region was the site of Saddam Hussein's infamous use of nerve gas against Iraqi civilians, which claimed thousands of lives.    Further, there is even now no truly solid assurance that the Kurds might not face a similar danger, following the end of the American and British occupation, from the new national government of Iraq .  

In addition, before the outbreak of the SECOND Persian Gulf War, rumors were flying that Turkey or Iran , or both together, might attempt to grab some Kurdish territory for themselves during or after the confusion.     When the American government dropped paratroopers into Kurdish territory, in large numbers, before the "official" second war with Iraq even began, some observers speculated that America's move    --   while establishing a "staging area" for a secondary invasion of the Baghdad area, and helping to straddle land connections between Baghdad and Syria    --     was also designed to deter Turkey and/or Iraq from making their own opportunistic incursions against the Kurds.  

Given this history, a majority or "supermajority" of Kurds should be guaranteed the opportunity to vote, in an honest plebiscite election, for continued regional autonomy in the new Iraq .     

This regional autonomy should explicitly include the legal authority for the Kurdish regional government to adopt (if desired) a regional "Bill of Rights", protecting freedom of religion and/or other selected individual liberties, which the new national government of Iraq would not be empowered to override.        That is:     Whatever restrictions on freedom of religion, and/or other individual liberties, the Shiite majority to the south might decide to impose on the rest of the country, the Kurdish tribes should be empowered, through their regionally autonomous government, to disregard on their own territory any or all of those restrictions that they care to veto.  

Of course, the new national government's pre-withdrawal agreement to honor Kurdish autonomy would only be as useful as that government's post-withdrawal willingness to keep its institutional word.     For this reason, a plebiscite proposal for Kurdish regional autonomy should include an explicit legal OPTION for the Kurdish regional government to invite American troops to stay within the Kurdish region, or to re-enter the region following withdrawal, for DEFENSIVE purposes.      Probably this legal authority should be a separate ballot question, in order to allow voters the option of selecting regional autonomy with or without the "backstop" authority to invite foreign troops onto Kurdish soil for an extended period.      

Whether listed as a separate question on the ballot or not, a majority or supermajority of Kurds would be likely to vote for at least the OPTION of inviting a long-term American presence in their region of Iraq .     Whatever their view of the ultimate intentions of the new national government, the Kurdish tribes might FREELY CHOOSE to invite a long-term American presence simply to deter their aggressive neighbors outside of Iraq .   

(b)     REGIONAL RIGHTS OF IRAQIS IN SUNNI MUSLIM AREAS.      While less than a third of Iraq 's overall population, Sunni Muslims nevertheless constitute a clear majority of Iraqis with certain geographically concentrated areas    --   primarily "The Sunni Triangle" near Baghdad , spanning parts of central and northern Iraq .      Iraqis living in the geographically contiguous, Sunni majority area of Iraq should have an opportunity to vote, in an honest election, for or against the same kind of regional autonomy that would be offered to the Kurdish Iraqis.    

Throughout the Islamic world, Sunni Muslims have traditionally been more tolerant and libertarian, at least in a RELATIVE sense, than Shiite Muslims.    The "cheering crowds of Baghdad ", televised around the globe as they joyfully tore down statues of Saddam Hussein, almost certainly contained far more Sunni Muslims than Shiite Muslims.  

Perhaps because the Sunni vision of the personal religious experience tends to be comparatively mystical and subjective, while the Shiite vision of the personal religious experience tends to be more legalistic and ritualistic, Sunni Muslim culture seems to allow room for more individual variations in the pursuit of service to Allah and a just society.    Libertarian impulses, in terms of both theology and lifestyle, seem to be notably stronger among Sunni Muslims.  

Yet, as I have noted in this month's 21st CENTURY POPULIST article, Sunni Muslims were a bedrock portion of Saddam Hussein's power base.  

Why would RELATIVELY libertarian Muslims knowingly support a ruthless dictator?     The answer, in the case of many Sunni Muslims, is easy:   Whatever their fear of, and distaste for, Saddam Hussein, they feared the Shiite majority more.  

Saddam Hussein might steal their money and trample on their freedoms, but he was not a religious fanatic, bent on stamping out their branch of Islam for its heresies.     Further, his ruthlessness and power made him strong enough to protect a religious minority.    In a predominantly Shitte  country run purely by majority rule, without the checks and balances of a Republic and the shield of an enforceable Bill of Rights, the ability of the Sunni Muslims to practice their own version of Islam, and to live their own chosen lifestyles, would have been problematic indeed.  

Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein's protection of Sunni Muslims often became, in practice, discrimination IN FAVOR of Sunni Muslims at the expense of the Shiite majority.     Over the long run, such "role reversal", with Sunni Muslims as the government-favored religion, did not promote the growth of overall theological and cultural tolerance.  

The continuing fear of an "unchained" Shiite majority, perhaps increased by the knowledge that many Shiite Muslims are angry over past mistreatment, could explain some of the continuing support, within "The Sunni Triangle", for remnants of Saddam Hussein's machine.     Some Sunni Muslims, outnumbered in Iraq by roughly 7 to 3, may still be more afraid of the Shiites than they are of Saddam Hussein.  

Conversely:     An opportunity to vote in an autonomous regional government for "The Sunni Triangle"   --    including the OPTION of voting to reserve legal authority to invite American troops to stay in the region, or return to it, for the DEFENSIVE purpose of protecting their regional autonomy     --    could deflate much of the remaining motivation for Sunni Muslims to bring back the Saddam Hussein machine.  

(c)     REGIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SHIITE MAJORITY.      It seems reasonable to provide for the rest of Iraq     --    basically, the Shiite majority regions in southern and central Iraq    --   the same opportunity to vote for regional autonomy and the right to invite foreign troops to stay or return.

However, while I would not care to forecast the vote on regional autonomy, I would predict that the option of allowing foreign troops in this largest  portion of Iraq would be voted down decisively.  

(d)     IRAQ 'S "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY".     Although I have been careful not to advocate the division of Iraq into 3 separate nations, it can be argued that the 3 autonomous regions within Iraq might grow over time into separate nations and thereby undercut Iraq 's "territorial integrity".  

My response is that this need not happen    --    unless the regions in question CHOOSE to make it happen.    I would add, however, that an ultimate outcome of 3 separate nations, evolving as such through the CHOICES of their populations, would not be a bad thing if it DID happen.  

Modern Iraq is, after all, less than a century old.     The country is a creation of the British Empire , with its worldwide reputation for establishing unstable countries by "drawing lines on a map"    --    without regard for religious, cultural or other organic divisions within the new country.   

In the case of Iraq, the British Empire took Shiite Arabs, Kurdish tribes and Sunni Muslims who had been functioning separately    ...   threw them all together within the chosen "lines on a map"   ...    and then announced, in essence:    "Hocus pocus!    Presto change-o!    You are all now IRAQIS!"  

As you may have noticed, Britain 's blithe disregard for historic cultural factors, in establishing some of the Balkan countries, and also in dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland , has not proven terribly sustainable over time.   

The British Empire 's handiwork has not held together very well in Iraq , either    --    or, at least, it has not held together very well during the last few decades.     

Shiite Arabs, with an overall majority of roughly 2-1 in Iraq as a whole, and much larger majorities in southern Iraq and parts of central Iraq , have generally not been comfortable with having so many Sunni Muslims within Iraq 's borders.     The unwanted pluralism has tempted some of them into intolerance, if not into jihadism.  

Many of the normally more libertarian Sunni Muslims, terrified of possible persecution by the Shiite majority, have been willing to "make a deal with the devil" by adopting Saddam Hussein as their protector against the Shiites.      

Meanwhile, the Kurds have been targeted for persecution, if not extinction, by Saddam Hussein and other fellow Iraqis    ...    by Iran     ...    by Turkey     ...    and by God knows who else.     Only their fighting skills, and their relative isolation, have kept them from being dispossessed completely, if not pushed toward extinction.  

Before the second Persian Gulf War began, the Bush Administration committed itself in advance to "preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq ".   Personally, given the history involved, and the ethnic conflicts which still simmer below the surface, I have never understood why the current, artificially imposed boundaries of Iraq should be taken as a sacrosanct starting point.  

Nevertheless, the regional plebiscites I have proposed would keep the current boundaries of Iraq intact, at least for a time.    Still, by allowing a greater degree of regional autonomy and ethnic separation, the plebiscites could:  

O      Reduce the degree to which Shiite Muslims within Iraq must deal with Sunni Muslims within Iraq , thereby reducing the  theological and cultural frustrations which tend to draw Shiite Muslims toward jihadists

O      Reduce the degree to which Sunni Muslims within Iraq must deal with Shiite Muslims within Iraq , AND allow voters in "The Sunni Triangle" to adopt the legal shield of a regional Bill of Rights and also  --   IF desired    --   the military shield of a continuing or "fallback" American presence, thereby reducing the fears which tend to draw Sunni Muslims toward the remnants of Saddam Hussein's machine AND ALSO tend to prevent "The Sunni Triangle" from becoming a  Middle Eastern refuge for relatively libertarian and progressive values

O      Provide a degree of permanence for Kurdish autonomy which could solidify the Kurdish portion of Iraq as a bedrock  American ally    --    and a much safer place to live  

(3)     LEAVE IN PLACE A  ** DEFENSIBLE **  "DEFENSE PERIMETER".    In my August 2003 article for THE 21st CENTURY POPULIST column, entitled "An Agenda For REAL National Security:   PRIORITY TWO", I stated that America should adopt as an ultimate policy goal  "zero American oil imports from the Middle East, and zero American troops in Middle Eastern countries where they are not wanted".  

Perhaps the last few words    --    "where they are not wanted"    --    should have been italicized.       There ARE countries in the Middle East where a long-term American military presence is apparently WELCOME by a majority of the population, as a shield against attacks from neighboring nations  who are comparatively less progressive and/or less libertarian.     Qatr and Kuwait are clear examples of such Middle Eastern countries.     In addition, as I have noted above, Afghanistan and PARTS of present-day Iraq MIGHT welcome the permanent presence of U.S. troops IF that presence is defensive, in the sense of being designed to deter potential aggression by neighboring nations, rather than offensive, in the sense of attempting to impose an unwanted political system and/or economic system onto the native population by force.  

It is not impossible, IF we display a basic respect for the internal sovereignty of the host nations involved, to envision:  

O     The continuation of defensible defensive deployments in the lower Persian Gulf (notably, in Qatr , Kuwait and perhaps Bahrain )

O     The establishment of new defensive deployments in the "autonomous" Kurdish portions of what is now northern Iraq , and

        possibly even in a newly autonomous "Sunni Triangle"

O     The continuation of defensive deployments in Afghanistan

AND POSSIBLY EVEN

O     The joint deployment of American and Russian forces, perhaps under the banner of the recently expanded NATO, along the

         borders with China and Outer Mongolia     --   as well as POSSIBLY in such former Soviet territories as Kazakhstan and  the other "Soviet Stans"  

Such a phalanx of strategic thrusts would put America 's military in a better position to do what it does best:     

O      DETERRING aggression against nations who actually WANT our protection

O      DEFENDING such nations, or more precisely helping them to defend themselves, when and if deterrence fails

WHILE AVOIDING

O      The awful practice of launching "pre-emptive" wars of aggression ourselves  

The particular pattern of deployment envisioned here would COMBINE an acceptance of likely historical inevitabilities WITH the exertion of leverage at those points where history may be more malleable.      

That is:      

Under the envisioned approach, we would not attempt to prevent the Shiite majority portions of Iraq from aligning with Iran if they choose.    Nor would we launch a new war in an effort to keep Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.     Nor would we bet the mortgage on the proposition that the current government of Saudi Arabia can be sustained in power indefinitely.     The defensive perimeter could be established so as to INCLUDE Saudi Arabia , while still being strong enough to function without Saudi Arabia in the event of a change in that country's government.  

Even with nuclear weapons, and perhaps a new ally gained through revolution in Saudi Arabia, a potential new jihadist axis of Iran and Iraq (and possibly Saudi Arabia) could not expand outward, by force, without encountering America's defensive military deployments in Kurdish Iraq to the north, northwest and west     ...    in Kuwait, Qatr and perhaps Bahrain to the southwest    ...     in parts of Russia, and perhaps in the "Soviet Stans" as well, to the north and northeast    ...    in Afghanistan to the east    ...   and in the Indian Ocean, home to U.S. naval vessels as well as major U.S. air and naval facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, to the south.  

In addition, independent military forces to the west, in and around Israel , would have to